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ABSTRACT: Airplanes, ships, nuclear power plants and chemical production plants (including oil & gas 
facilities) are examples of industries that depend upon the interaction between operators and machines. 
Consequently, to assess the risks of those systems, not only the reliability of the technological compo-
nents has to be accounted for, but also the ‘human model’. For this reason, engineers have been working 
together with psychologists and sociologists to understand cognitive functions and how the organisa-
tional context influences individual actions.
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) identifies and analyses the causes, consequences and contributions 
of human performance (including failures) in complex sociotechnical systems. Generally, HRA research is 
concentrated in modelling workers’ performance in the “sharp-end”, assessing the ones directly involved 
in handling the system, especially operators. However, in theory, a reliability analysis can be applied to any 
kind of human action, including those from designers and managers.
This research will evaluate a way of conducting HRA in the design process, as previous research has 
demonstrated that design failure is the predominant contributor to human errors (Moura et al., 2016).
Bayesian Network (BN) – a systematic way of learning from experience and incorporating new evi-
dence (deterministic or probabilistic) – is proposed to model the complex relationships within cognitive 
functions, organisational and technological factors. Conditional probability tables have been obtained 
from a dataset of major accidents from different industry sectors (Moura et al. 2017), using a classifica-
tion scheme developed by Hollnagel (1998) for an HRA method called CREAM – Cognitive Reliability 
and Error Analysis Method.
 The model allows to infer which factors most influence human performance in different scenarios. 
Also, we will discuss if  the model can be applied to any human actions through the project life cycle—
since the design phase to the operational phase, including their management.
The expected results of such study can be either 
qualitative or quantitative, depending on the 
industry sector best practice, data availability and 
regulatory requirements.
Quantitative results for HRA means giving the 
human performance a number, a probability of 
occurrence—the so-called Human Error Prob-
ability (HEP). This gives decision-makers the 
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Human Reliability Analysis (HRA)
Human reliability analysis can have three objec-
tives: identify human performance (as failures and 
their consequences), quantify the likelihood of 
failure (and error recovery) and to reduce or reme-
diate those errors in the system (Kirwan, 1997).
330
opportunity to decrease the HEP to as low as prac-
ticable by tackling the factors that impact it, or to 
check if  a certain risk criteria is met.
HRA research, practice and regulatory require-
ments are currently focused on operation and 
maintenance workers—called ‘sharp-end’ work-
ers—those who actually interact with the processes 
(Reason, 1990; Hollnagel, 1998).
1.2 HRA in design phase
Can human reliability analysis be applied in other 
phases of an industrial project, such as design, con-
struction, commissioning and decommissioning?
Theoretically speaking, it is possible: where 
there is human action, there is the possibility to 
model, analyse and measure performance (Hol-
lnagel, 1998).
This research will focus on the design phase and 
design changes during other phases, as there is evi-
dence from previous studies that design failure is 
the organisational factor that most triggers human 
failure actions (Moura et al., 2016).
One of the constraints of this approach is that 
human (engineers and managers) performance in 
the design stage has limited public data, preventing 
detailed task analyses.
However, it is also known that design failures 
identified in latter stages of the lifecycle (i.e. opera-
tional phase) are much more expensive to correct, 
compared to those detected during the design stage 
(Kohler and Moffatt, 2003).
Thus, it is believed that understanding engi-
neers and managers performance during the 
design phase would have the potential to motivate 
improvements in organisational design procedures, 
based on overall accident patterns.
It is a trade-off  between having perfect data but 
not sufficient resources to make design changes in 
the operational phase and having imperfect data 
but sufficient resources to improve the design in 
earlier stages of the lifecycle.
1.3 Can human performance influence design?
Design failure is often considered an organisational 
factor in HRAs, as the methods and assessors take 
into account that it influences human performance 
and not the opposite.
In contrast, there are studies, outside the safety 
and engineering community, showing that organi-
sations are not an unmanned box of procedures, 
but individuals deciding whether using them, based 
on other factors like regulations, knowledge and 
resources (Rocha Fernandes et al., 2005). Besides, 
those individuals, usually middle and front-line 
managers, have a significant influence in all levels 
of the organisation, dictating and implementing 
the organisational strategy (Wooldridge et al., 
2008; Purcell, 2007).
Another key aspect of this discussion is recog-
nising the difference between ‘managing the design’ 
and ‘managing design changes’. First, because they 
can occur in different phases of a project and thus 
managed by completely different team profiles.
Second, because decision-making in engineering 
practice can have two distinct meanings: ‘design 
decisions’ are the ones about the design itself  (e.g. 
which equipment to choose in a system), while 
‘management decisions’ are the ones about the 
team responsible for designing the system or issues 
that impact this team (Herrmann, 2015).
Each of these different concepts leads to a dif-
ferent kind of performance to analyse.
2 METHODOLOGY
2.1 Classification scheme used
The classification scheme is considered the col-
lection of error modes (cognitive functions and 
human actions) and the Performance Shaping Fac-
tors (PSFs) which shapes the context that triggers 
each error mode.
To achieve the aim of this research, it is essential 
to use an HRA classification scheme that recog-
nises cognitive functions, as both ‘design decisions’ 
and ‘management decisions’ cannot be evidenced 
only by actions described in most classification 
schemes from the first generation of HRAs.
For this reason, a classification scheme of the 
second generation of HRA was chosen (see Hol-
lnagel, 1998, to understand the differences between 
the first and the second HRA generation).
From the publicly available ones, there are only 
two methods from the second generation that are 
considered useful to the Major Hazard Directo-
rates of HSE, the UK safety regulator (Bell and 
Holroyd, 2009): CREAM (Hollnagel, 1998) and 
ATHEANA (Forester et al., 2007).
From these two choices, CREAM’s (i.e. the 
Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method) 
classification scheme was chosen to conduct this 
research, as it shows a clear distinction between 
causes and manifestations. This enables the appli-
cation of the method in both directions: to ana-
lyse major accidents retrospectively and to predict 
events as a traditional HRA method. Therefore, this 
feature made it possible to use a pre-existent dataset 
from major industrial accidents (Moura et al., 2016) 
in the current work, as explained in the next section.
This classification scheme splits cognitive func-
tions into two categories: analysis (the mental 
processes used when someone tries to understand a 
problem) and synthesis (the mental processes used 
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to solve the problem). Further, these are also split 
into subcategories, as summarized in Table 1.
One of the problems that may be argued against 
this choice is that most HRA performed in practice 
are the ones from the first generation (Zwirglmaier 
et al., 2015, Henderson and Embrey, 2012), such as 
THERP, HEART and SPAR-H. Also, according 
to CREAM’s creator, all the PSFs presented at the 
classification scheme are still useful, apart from the 
cognitive reliability, that he considers a ‘misleading 
oversimplification’ (Hollnagel, 2012). According 
to him, “explaining human performance as based 
on ‘cognitive processes’ represents a myopic infor-
mation processing view, and talking about the reli-
ability of such processes is an artefact of the PRA/
PSA mindset”.
However, the current research is not using 
CREAM as an HRA method, limiting the discus-
sion to the assessment of the HEPs, as a way to 
disclose possible improvements.
2.2 Data used
To generate Human Error Probabilities (HEP), or to 
validate HRA methods, different types of data are 
used. Kirwan (1997) classified them as: (i) real or 
operationally derived data (i.e. from incidents and 
near misses), (ii) simulator derived data, (iii) data 
from the psychological and ergonomics performance 
literature, (iv) expert judgement, (v) other techniques.
Data from real operation are considered the 
one with highest quality, but also the more dif-
ficult to obtain. That is because to achieve an 
absolute result for the HEP (number of observed 
errors by the number of opportunities for error) 
both the numerator and denominator of the equa-
tion should be assessed by the observation of each 
human action through an industry lifecycle. This is 
impractical, as one should count even the actions 
and errors that have not led to incidents.
For this reason, much research is being con-
ducted using operationally derived data as near 
misses (i.e. events with the potential for undesirable 
consequences (CCPS, 2007) and accidents occurred 
in industrial installations.
Preischl and Hellmich (2013) used data from 
near misses, occurred on German nuclear power 
plants, to construct their model to estimate HEPs, 
in order to check validation of THERP handbook 
estimates. Groth and Mosleh (2012) have used the 
HERA database, from retrospective analyses of 
risk-significant events occurred on nuclear power 
plants, that contain at least one human error.
In the current research, it was decided to use a 
dataset derived from major accidents from different 
industrial sectors, not yet tested as model to estimate 
HEPs: the MATA-D – Multi-attribute Technologi-
cal Accidents Dataset, built by Moura et al. (2016).
Differently from near misses reports, investiga-
tion reports of major accidents have the potential 
to uncover more PSFs that trigger a human error. 
This is because major accidents’ investigations 
usually use several man-hours of an expert team 
(Moura et al. 2016)aiming to achieve an increased 
depth of analysis, eventually reaching root causes 
such as organizational issues (CCPS, 2007).
MATA-D has been derived from the analysis of 
238 accident reports from different industrial sec-
tors using the same classification scheme, with the 
intention to optimise the learning from cross-sec-
tor accidents. All the reports had evidence on the 
presence of organisational, technological and per-
son-related factors, the PSFs described in Table 3. 
Also, nearly half  of all the reports had indications 
about the cognitive functions and actions executed, 
described in Tables 1 and 2.
The MATA-D dataset is a table of 238 accidents 
by fifty-three parameters (thirty-nine factors, ten 
cognitive functions and four erroneous actions), 
where the number one represents the presence of 
a parameter in an accident report and the zero its 
absence.
For the reasons listed above, it has been decided 
to use the available MATA-D data to feed a model, 
in order to understand if  the results could describe 
human performance in design and its management, 
instead of modelling the whole process, developing 
PSFs, collecting data and creating a new method 
from scratch.
2.3 Modelling method used—Bayesian network
The relationships between PSFs, cognitive func-
tions and human erroneous actions described 
Table  1. Summary of errors of cognition used in 
CREAM.
Analysis Observation
Observation missed
False observation 
Wrong identification
Interpretation Faulty diagnosis
Wrong reasoning 
Decision error
Delayed interpretation
Incorrect prediction
Synthesis Planning Inadequate plan
Priority error
Table  2. Erroneous actions used in the classification 
scheme.
Errors of execution
Wrong time Wrong type Wrong place Wrong object
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above were modelled into a Bayesian network 
(BN). BN is known as a systematic way of learning 
from experience and to incorporate new evidence 
(deterministic or probabilistic), and it was chosen 
due to the possibility of modelling those complex 
relationships within variables of different nature.
Mkrtchyan et al. (2015) had suggested that using 
BN, human reliability analysis also benefits from:
i. Its graphical formalism (Figure  1) of condi-
tional probability equations (Equation 1). Using 
the visual representation of BN is a practical 
way of discussing the relations between factors, 
facilitating the communication between the 
multidisciplinary team that should be involved 
in an HRA meeting analysis, such as engineers, 
psychologists and sociologists.
P(C=c1 | A=a1,B=b1) P(C=c2 | A=a1,B=b1) = 
1–P(C=c1 | A=a1,B=b1) (1)
ii. A probabilistic representation of uncertainty, 
making it compatible with Probabilistic Safety 
Assessment.
iii. Combination of different sources of informa-
tion: empirical sources as databases of events, 
theoretical models of human cognition and 
expert judgement.
The mathematical background of Bayesian 
networks was described by Tolo et al. (2014) as 
statistical models used to represent probability dis-
tributions, that can provide combined probability 
distribution associated to an accident, exploiting 
information about the existing conditional depend-
encies, e.g. between PSFs and cognitive functions.
BNs are represented by acyclic graphs, where 
nodes are connected to each other by arcs 
(Figure 1). Child nodes must have a causality rela-
tionship with each parent node.
For example, consider in Figure  2, the child 
node ‘cognitive function’. The probability of its 
occurrence is conditioned to the occurrence of 
its parent nodes: organisation, technology and 
Table 3. PSFs from CREAM classification scheme.
Organisational  
factors
Technological  
factors
Person related  
factors
Communication  
failure
Equipment  
failure
Memory failure
Fear
Missing information Software fault Distraction
Maintenance failure Inadequate  
procedure
Fatigue
Performance
Inadequate quality  
control
Access  
limitations
Variability
Inattention
Management  
problem
Ambiguous  
information
Physiological  
stress
Design failure Incomplete  
information
Psychological  
stress
Inadequate task  
allocation
Access  
problems
Functional 
impairment
Social pressure Mislabelling Cognitive style
Insufficient skills Cognitive bias
Insufficient  
knowledge
Temperature
Sound
Humidity
 Illumination
Other
Adverse ambient  
conditions
Excessive demand
Inadequate workplace  
layout
Inadequate team  
support
Irregular working  
hours
Figure 1. Directed acyclic graphs typical of a Bayesian 
network.
Figure 2. Example of a Bayesian network.
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person-related functions. To have a proper causal-
ity, one has to know the answer to the question: 
what is the probability of occurring a cognitive 
function when the organisation, technology or per-
son related factors occur altogether? What about 
when none of them occurs? And if  only an organi-
sational factor occurs, and no technology and per-
son-related factor? All possible eight combinations 
from three parent nodes have to be answered, to 
establish a proper causality.
Generically speaking, the number of combina-
tions a conditional probability table has to repre-
sent a child node is two (pair of combinations) to 
the power of the number of parent nodes (2^par-
ent nodes).
This means a high number of combinations if  
all the factors of the CREAM methodology are 
considered. The implications of this issue are dis-
cussed in the next section.
3 MODEL
3.1 Bayesian model of human reliability
To build and test the human reliability model, it 
was used the summarised process represented by 
Figure  3. It was proposed by Mkrtchyan et al. 
(2015), through their review of HRA methods 
using BN models.
First, the nodes and their states were defined. 
Then, the structure, which means the links between 
the nodes. After the structure, comes the assessment 
of Conditional Probability Tables (CPT) for each 
node. Finally, a verification was conducted. The vali-
dation process will be conducted in a future work.
3.2 Nodes and states
The nodes used in the model are the sub-factors of 
CREAM classification scheme (Hollnagel, 1998), 
where the major factors are human, technology 
and organisation.
The states of the nodes will be ‘presence’ or 
‘absence’ of the sub-factors observed during the 
investigation of major accidents.
The result of the MATA-D dataset, presented 
in the methodology section of this paper, has fed 
our model as a matrix of zeros and ones of 53 
rows × 238 columns. At the dataset, the absence of 
a parameter (factor, cognitive function or action) is 
represented by the number zero and the presence of 
them in an accident represented by the number one.
Only the factors, cognitive functions and actions 
in italic in Tables 1 and 2 were used as nodes for the 
model. The reason is explained in the next section.
3.3 Structure
Basically, to create the structure of this BN model, 
parent nodes (organisational, technological and 
person-related factors) were linked by arrows to 
the child nodes (cognitive functions and human 
erroneous actions).
It would be that simple if  there were no limita-
tions from the algorithm used to build the model 
in Genie software. For the reason explained in sec-
tion 2.2, the thirty-nine factors provided by the clas-
sification scheme would generate 549,755,813,888 
combinations (two to the power of thirty-nine) – 
more that was supported by the BN software used.
The algorithm supports a large number of 
nodes, but not a large number of connections to 
one child node. Therefore, it was necessary to make 
assumptions to simplify the model structure.
To make assumptions about connections 
between nodes, one must have a clear understand-
ing of the causal relationship that factors transmit 
to cognitive functions.
That is the reason why the most common way to 
simplify a model, for human reliability purpose, is 
using expert judgement, also known as expert elici-
tation (Mkrtchyan et al. 2015). However, it is also 
the stage where happens one of the most claimed 
disadvantages of using Bayesian networks for 
human reliability analysis: it is argued that experts 
can bring more uncertainties to a model due to 
their personal bias.
In an attempt to avoid this kind of uncertainty, 
the strategy was to let the data ‘speak’ for itself. 
This strategy has been already used by Groth and 
Mosleh’s (2012) at their BN model, where they had 
introduced nodes of ‘error context’ to align certain 
combinations of PIFs that are more likely to produce 
human errors than the individual PSFs acting alone.
At the present work, the ‘error context’ was rep-
resented as the arcs of the BN model instead of the 
nodes. The context was imported from the treat-
ment applied by Moura et al. (2017) to their data-
set, to disclose common patterns and significant 
features among major accidents. They have used an 
artificial neural network approach to the dataset, 
a data mining process that translated the informa-
tion into a graphical interface, the self-organising 
maps (SOM). Analysing them, one can perceive 
that the 238 accidents are allocated into four differ-
ent regions, shaped by the clustering of accidents 
with a similar profile and, thus, a similar combina-
tion of factors, cognitive functions and actions.Figure 3. Process to build a BN model to HRA.
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Summing up, the model connections were pro-
posed based on those SOM relations: factors that 
were in the cluster #1 were linked only to cognitive 
functions located on the same cluster, and the same 
process was repeated for all the clusters.
Simplifications to the network structure were 
applied not only to the connections but also to 
the number of nodes. Using previous research by 
Moura et al. (2017), the nodes were restricted to 
the factors, cognitive functions and actions consid-
ered significant for the dataset of major accidents 
by the self-organising maps algorithm.
Consequently, if  a factor had represented nega-
tive or very low variations in the formation of one 
of the SOM clusters, it was interpreted that that 
factor was not significant to the causation pattern 
of major accidents and, consequently, it was not 
included in the Bayesian model presented in this 
paper. The considered nodes are presented in italic 
in Tables 1, 2 and 3, and in the nodes represented 
in Figure 4.
The model considers that cognitive functions 
are affected by each factor and that human erro-
neous actions are affected by the factors and by 
the cognitive functions. That is because the model 
assumes that workers have a mental process behind 
their actions (Hollnagel, 1998).
3.4 Conditional Probability Tables (CPT)
Conditional probability tables have been obtained 
from the dataset of major accidents from differ-
ent industry sectors (Moura et al. 2017), using the 
CREAM classification scheme (Hollnagel, 1998).
After the simplification on the network, the 
higher number of combinations to a child node 
reached was the node ‘wrong place’, with nineteen 
parent nodes combinations, considering the possi-
bility of occurring a ‘wrong place action’ influenced 
by sixteen factors and three cognitive functions. 
That means 524,288 combinations, and thus 
524,288 probabilities of an action to occur or not.
The prior probabilities of the model were 
obtained by calculating how many times a specific 
combination occurred, divided by the total number 
of accidents of the dataset.
3.5 Software used
The accident dataset developed by Moura et al. 
(2016) has been originally built as a table of zeros 
and ones, that was uploaded to the BN software.
If the number of combinations was small, an 
Excel spreadsheet could be used to find the CPT and 
export to GeNIe software. However, as presented 
in the previous section, the dataset generated con-
ditional probability tables of 524,288 probabilities 
for some child nodes. This row (or vector) of data 
extrapolates Excel software limits, and thus Matlab 
had to be used. Also, to optimise the data gathering, 
it was necessary some coding skills to create the Con-
ditional Probability Tables—as ‘filtering’ the combi-
nations in Excel would consume too much time.
The BN model was built in GeNIe Modeler for 
academic use (BayesFusion, LLC). The clustering 
algorithm embedded in the software was used to 
calculate the posterior probabilities, and the node 
type used was ‘chance—general’.
Useful explanations of how to use the GeNIe 
software can be found in the manual provided by 
the developer and also by the authors of an evacu-
ation time analysis of ships using BN (Sarshar 
et al., 2013).
4 RESULTS
After building the model, inserting the prior prob-
abilities of parent and child nodes (through their Figure 4. Bayesian model considered.
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conditional probability tables), the marginal prob-
ability distributions were calculated using Genie 
software, as presented in Table 4:
Although a validation was not yet conducted, 
the order of magnitude of the HEPs (cognitive 
functions and erroneous actions) is consistent with 
HRA directives from the Oil & Gas industry (OGP, 
2010), and HRA documents obtained at the web-
site of the Environmental Protection Department 
of The Government of the Hong Kong (2017). A 
validation is needed to understand if  the model is 
optimistic or pessimistic, according to validation 
criteria discribed by Kirwan (1997).
4.1 Verification step
To verify if  the model behaves according to its 
specifications, some scenarios were created, chang-
ing the factors to its extremes. It means that each 
parent node was assumed to be 0 and 1 separately. 
In other words, each factor (organisational, per-
sonal and technological) was assumed to be absent 
or present in an industrial scenario.
To achieve that, after changing the factors, the 
posterior probabilities of the human perform-
ance nodes were calculated, updating the Bayesian 
network.
4.2 Sensibility of human performance to each 
factor
To infer which factors most influence human per-
formance, the results from the verification process 
have been used.
When a factor node was set as present in a sce-
nario (state 1 of the node), it was assumed that 
the variation caused to the posterior probability 
of a human performance node is the sensibility 
of this parameter to that change. Note that the 
parameters are represented by small probabilities, 
so changes in their marginal probability are also 
expected to be small. Thus, for better visualisation 
of the sensibility, the variation in percentage has 
been calculated.
As can be noticed in Table  5, there is a slight 
increase in the presence of missed observations 
when Inadequate Quality Control and Design 
Failure, both organizational factors, are present 
in a scenario. Moderated positive variation is also 
perceived when the technological factors equip-
ment failure and inadequate procedure are present. 
Interpretation functions (faulty diagnosis, wrong 
reasoning and decision error) are the most influ-
enced parameters by changes in organisational and 
technological factors.
Errors in design and equipment failures also 
increase errors in interpretation functions (mainly 
in wrong reasoning), but the results show a more 
accentuated positive variation at interpretation 
when changes of quality control, task allocation 
and knowledge (related to training) occurs.
While interpretation has its presence affected by 
training (knowledge), planning incidence seems to 
be more related to experience (skills).
Failures in equipment increase the possibility of 
poor planning in an accident scenario, but not as 
much as the inadequate quality control and design 
failure, both organisational factors.
Errors of execution (wrong time, type and place) 
are triggered by quality control, design failure, task 
allocation and, with fewer effect, equipment failure.
The results suggest that some factors do not 
make cognitive functions vary positively, possi-
bly meaning that an error on cognitive functions 
would not occur with a scenario with errors in fac-
tors as maintenance, management, social pressure 
and irregular working hours.
5 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSIONS
The Bayesian model proposed was built to serve 
as a tool to predict human performance in indus-
trial scenarios, i.e. the human failure probability, 
with the potential to be applied in different sectors 
such as chemical (including oil & gas processing), 
nuclear and aviation.
The novelty of the present model is the use of 
a dataset of major accidents to define the basic 
aspects of a Bayesian network HRA model: nodes, 
states, structure and prior probabilities (conditional 
probability table). The model was developed as one 
of the objectives to achieve the aim of understand-
ing human performance in the design phase.
Some discussions are developed below in the 
form of answers to questions proposed for this 
research.
5.1 Can this model be used for HRA purposes?
Not yet. All the steps of the model were executed, 
apart from the validation. The intention is to 
Table 4. Marginal probabilities of human performance.
Cognitive functions Actions
Observation Wrong time 4.21e-04
Observation missed 8.12e-05 Wrong type 1.73e-04
Interpretation Wrong place 4.64e-04
Faulty diagnosis 1.05e-03
Wrong reasoning 1.05e-03
Decision error 6.35e-04
Planning
Inadequate plan 1.22e-03
Priority error 6.50e-04
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validate the model against data from recent major 
accident that are not yet covered by the original 
dataset, to measure if  the model describes other 
real operational data.
In future works, the dataset can be adapted to 
PSFs of classification schemes from other HRA 
methods.
5.2 Is the model able to describe human actions 
through all the project life cycle?
Although the verification step suggests the model 
is capable of inferring which factors most influ-
ence human performance, the model still interprets 
design as a PSF affecting human performance in 
other stages—and do not consider PSFs affecting 
designers. In addition, it is believed that some fac-
tors may influence design phase in a different way 
from the prior probability extracted from the data-
set of major accidents
Although it is believed that this model cannot 
describe the design phase, it has the potential to 
describe changes in design during the operational 
phase. In fact, that is one of the uncertainties that 
need to be investigated in the dataset used, as 
some situations described as a design failure can 
be attributed to changes in the initial design dur-
ing latter phases. This can also change part of the 
prior probabilities considered in this model.
Further development must consider the creation 
of new PSFs, with new organisational factors that 
should be considered during design. It seems that 
expert elicitation will have to be considered phase—
as there is few public evidence of this process.
5.3 Can this model be used to understand 
decision-makers performance during design?
The model has the potential to describe front-
line and middle managers’ routine and emergency 
performance, during the operational phase. It is 
expected that it will give a better description of 
cognitive functions than actions, as a reflection of 
the decision-makers typical job description.
However, further investigation should be con-
ducted to understand how specific factors affect 
different people in the organisation, specially for 
organisational factors for which results suggested 
that the impact in cognitive function is marginal, 
such as social pressure and irregular working 
hours. These factors, for instance, are reported 
in the literature (Thomas et al., 1999) to affect 
middle-managers in a different way, compared to 
sharp-end employees.
The importance of understanding managers’ 
safety performance is part of the present research, 
as a way of investigating if  improving their per-
formance on safety issues has the potential to lead PE
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industries to better organisational factors and 
fewer accidents. Managers are linked at the same 
time to top management and operational teams—
having the opportunity to sell new ideas to top 
management and to promote strategic change to 
employees (Wooldridge et al., 2008; Purcell, 2007).
For this reason, it is recommended that further 
models consider all factors proposed by CREAM’s 
classification scheme, instead of only using the 
significant ones according to previous research 
(Moura et al., 2017). Accounting for factors like 
‘excessive demand’ and ‘cognitive style’ might give 
an improved model for managers’ roles. With this 
purpose, different software and algorithms to cal-
culate posterior probabilities have to be tested, to 
support more links between nodes. Therefore, Cos-
san (Patelli et al., 2018), a software for Uncertainty 
Quantification and its Bayesian network toolbox 
will be tested in the future.
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